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Abstract

In considering America's reaction to the Holocaust, scholars must address serious
charges that America bears some culpability for what happened. A survey of prominent
historical studies and contemporary documents such as newspaper aIiicles, committee
repOlis, and other government documents prove America had some knowledge ofthe
Holocaust, but did little in response. Considering the United States' knowledge ofthe
situation in Germany, America's restrictive immigration policy in the 1930s makes her at
least partially responsible for some of the lives lost. Other measures to stop the
Holocaust, such as rescue, ransom, or bombing attempts, would not have been feasible or
effective.
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AccessOlY to Genocide? An Exploration of America's Response to the Holocaust
In his classic study of the Holocaust, David Wyman argues, "The Nazis were the
murderers, but we [the United States] were the all too passive accomplices."! Wyman's
statement lies in sharp contrast to the views of William Rubenstein who claims, " ... no
Jews who perished during the Nazi Holocaust could have been saved by any action which
the Allies could have taken at the time ... Hitler, the Nazis and their accomplices--and
only they--bear full and total responsibility for the Holocaust. .. ,,2 These contrasting
statements concerning America's responsibility and role during the Holocaust represent
opposite extremes in historical analysis. Gennany's systematic murder of six million
people during World War II evokes volatile and emotional reactions even from scholars
who attempt to study it over sixty years later. Many express understandable feelings of
shock, horror, and anger that such an atrocity occurred and that the beacon of democracy,
the United States of America, allowed it.
When studying the Holocaust, most people rightly declare that no such atrocity
should ever happen. At times such feelings of shock and anger translate into thoughts
that the United States and other democracies should not have allowed it to happen and
could have done something to prevent it. Much recent scholarship on the Holocaust
agrees with David Wyman in accusing the United States of being a willing accomplice to
the Holocaust because of its failure to ease its immigration policy, rescue Holocaust
victims, or bomb the concentration camps. In reaction to this academic trend, histOlians
such as William D. Rubenstein gravitate toward the opposite extreme and declare that no
David Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), ix.
William D. Rubenstein, The Myth ofRescue: Why the Democracies Could Not Have Saved More
Jewsji-om the Nazis (New York: Routledge, 1997), x.
I
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change in U.S. policies at the time could have saved any lives. As with most historical
and ethical questions, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. While both the American
government and people had sufficient knowledge of Gennan persecution of the Jews in
the 1930s and the Holocaust during World War II to take action, the only effective
measure within their power would have been liberalization of ilmnigration policies in the
late 1930s. Other actions such as rescue or bombing effOlis would most likely have
failed.
Before examining America's response to the Holocaust, histOlians must consider
how much knowledge the U.S. government and public had about the events occurring in
Gennany under Adolf Hitler's regime. From the earliest persecution ofthe Jews in Nazi
Gennany to the culmination of the Final Solution, both the U.S. government and the
American public had access to infonnation about the plight of Gennan Jews, though such
reports often received little attention. Furthern10re, social attitudes and preoccupation
with the war meant that the United States failed to recognize the fate of the Jews as
unique and remained reluctant to take action on their behalf.
Even in the early years of Hitler's regime, the American public had access to
infonnation regarding the treatment ofthe Jews. Historian Deborah Lipstadt argues,
"There was practically no aspect of the Nazi horror which was not publicly known in
some detail long before the camps were opened in 1945.,,3 The American Jewish
Committee published a pamphlet in 1933 entitled, The Jews in Nazi Germany, with the
purpose of educating Am eli cans about the sufferings ofthe Jews under Hitler. The
pamphlet contained reports of Gem1an effOlis to exclude Jewish culture and ideas from

3 Deborah Lipstadt, Beyond Belief The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust, 19331945 (New Yark: Free Press, 1986), 2.
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society by ridding libraries of Jewish works. 4 Newspapers fmiher testified that Jews
faced discrimination as the Nazis sought to eliminate them fi-om professions such as
medicine and law and enforced boycotts of Jewish stores and businesses, even shutting
them down in the name of "hygienic control."s The New York Times included stories of
Americans who fled Gennany soon after the Nazis took control. Other media outlets
repOlied that Gennany practiced censorship of all media and secretly persecuted the
Jews, expelling many from the country, including " ... some ofthe best brains in her
financial world and many of the best in commerce, medicine, the law and arts.,,6 As the
situation for Jews in Gennany became worse, Americans had access to infonnation about
it, but newspapers often ran short stories that were relegated to back pages. 7 FUliher,
most Americans remained preoccupied with the Depression; consequently, news of Nazi
did not make much of an impression on the average casual newspaper reader.
In the late 1930s, several events highlighted the U.S. attitude regarding Nazi
policies toward the Jews. In 1935 Gennany passed the Nuremburg laws with much antiSemitic pomp and rhetoric. The laws sought to further separate Jews from the rest of
Gennan society, denying them citizenship, access to public schools, and the right to
marry Aryans. 8 The move came the year before Berlin was scheduled to hold the 1936
Olympic Games. Gem1any's new attacks on the Jews ignited a controversy over whether
the United States should attend the Olympics or boycott them as a symbol of protest
against Gennany's policies. Starting as early as 1934 the American Olympic Committee

4 The London Times, March 27,1933 inAmerica Views the Holocaust, 1933-1945: A Brief
Documentmy HistOlY, edited by Robert H. Abzug. Boston: BedfordlSt. Martin's, 1999, 12.
5 Berliner Tageblatt, May 14, 1933 America Views the Holocaust, 13.
6"German Fugitives Tell of the Atrocities of the Nazis," The New York Times, March 20, 1933.
7 Wyman, 20.
8 Newsweek, "Germany: Hitler Decrees Swastika Reich Flag; Bars Intermarriage; Relegates Jews
to the Dark Ages," September 21, 1935 in America Views the Holocaust, 55-58.
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sought assurances fi.-om Berlin that non-Aryans would be treated fairly at the Olympic
Games. While they received official promises of impartiality, reports of mistreatment
belied Gennan intentions and led Catholic and Jewish groups, labor unions, the New York
Times, and some Protestant organizations to push for a boycott to condelIDl Gennany's
cruelty.9 Ernest Lee Jahncke, a Gennan-American member ofthe International Olympic
Committee wrote, " ... under the domination ofthe Nazi government the Gennan sports
authorities have violated and are continuing to violate every requirement of fair play in
the conduct of sports in Gennany ... ,,10 Even though the United States attended the 1936
Olympics in Berlin, the issue of race would not go away. I I
In November 1938 the Nazis can"ied out what Louis Lochner called " ... the most
ten"ible experience in all my life ... the anti-Semitic orgy of November 10 and days
following.,,12 This event would later be known as Kristallnacht, or the "night of broken
glass." Nazi party members unleashed vicious violence against the Jews, destroying
property and beating, raping, and killing those that crossed their path. More than 90 Jews
lost their lives in the violence. 13 After Kristallnachtmany Gennan Jews gave up their
illusions about staying in their country and detennined to emigrate, precipitating a
refugee crisis for Europe and the United States.
While the Nazis persecuted and at times murdered Jews in the late 1930s, the
Holocaust, which is the Gennan attempt to systematically eliminate the Jews as race, did
not begin until at least 1939. Gernlany's invasion of Poland in September 1939

Abzug, 61.
Ernest Lee Jalmcke, "Letter to Count Henri Baillet-Latour," November 25, 1935 in America
Views the Holocaust, 64.
II
Ab zug,70.
12 Louis Loc1mer, "Letter to Betty and Bobby," November 28, 1938 in America Views the
Holocaust, 73.
13 Abzug, 54.
9
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inaugurated new policies toward Jews and others who threatened Gennan power that
eventually led to the Holocaust. Historians debate whether Hitler planned to destroy the
Jews from the beginning of his regime or whether those plans developed during the war.
Christopher R. Browning argues that the Nazis had always been decisively committed to
ending the' Jewish problem,' but they searched for various solutions including forced
emigration and expulsion before embarking on a course of mass murder which is known
as the Holocaust. 14 The tactics used in Poland were pad ofthe Nazi search for such a
solution and provided an early 0ppOliunity for the Nazis to experiment with various
approaches to their war against 'inferior' races. In Poland, the Nazis defined their enemy
in racial tenns and used a new level ofbmtality to eliminate the Polish elite that could
challenge Gennan power. IS The Nazis used the Einsatzgruppen to kill Poland's upper
classes and ordinary civilians in Operation TANNENBURG. 16 The Einsatzgruppen 's
practice of shooting civilians in Poland set a precedent for the bmtality against Jews that
occurred on a larger scale when the Gennans invaded the Soviet Union. 17 While Nazi
policy toward the Jews of Europe in 1939 remained focused on forced emigration and
resettlement to places such as Madagascar, the tactics used in Poland intensified Gennan
animosity and violence toward the Jews that would become fully manifest in the Final
Solution. 18
Despite the activities ofthe Einsatzgruppen in Poland and the Soviet Union, the
Nazis did not officially adopt the Final Solution until 1942. By this time, Gennany had

14 Christopher R. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution ofNazi Jewish
Policy, September 1939-March 1942 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 424.
15 Alexander B. Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitz!o-ieg, Ideology, and Atrocity (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2003), 227-228.
16 Ibid., 228.
17 Ibid., 234.
18 Ibid., 233-235.
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already declared war against the United States; thus, Germany had no diplomatic reason
to curb its cruelty towards the Jews as a means of preserving American neutrality.19 The

Einsatzgruppen tactics of shooting individuals proved 'inefficient' in the Soviet Union
and psychologically hannful to the executioners and thus the Nazis believed they needed
a more effective solution. At the Wannsee Conference in 1942, Nazis leaders officially
adopted a policy of destroying the Jews as a race through mass murder. 20 Conference
attendees used such tenns "liquidation" and "extennination" to describe their plans for
the Jews. The only question remaining was the method ofkilling. 21 The Nazis
eventually decided on using tactics they had established in 1941 and began killing their
victims in the gas chambers of the concentration camps.22 The Final Solution proved to
be more efficient than previous approaches and quicldy destroyed Jews en masse. If
prisoners did not die on the marches to the concentration camps fi'om disease, hunger, or
exposure, the gas chambers that waited for them would carry out their grisly work.

23

Most historians agree that U.S. intelligence officials were aware of some of the Nazi
atrocities in the extennination camps, though the American public generally had only
piecemeal infonnation due to sporadic and scant media coverage. 24
While the American government had received reports of severe Nazi persecution
of Jews based solely on their racial or religious background, it did not receive official
confinnation that the Gennans intended on eliminating the Jews as a group until late
1942. Initial reports reached the State Department by August, 1942, but skeptical

Browning, 410.
Ibid., 413.
21 Ibid., 413.
22 Ibid., 424.
23 Abzurg, 109-111.
24 Ibid., 111.
19
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officials requested the infonnation be kept secret until they could confinn it and thus the
public did not receive the infonnation until November. 25 Confirmation of Nazi practices
came from a prominent Gennan industrialist whose contributions to the Gennan war
effort gave him access to confidential infonnation regarding the Jews. The businessman
contacted Dr. Gerhart Riegner, the representative of the World Jewish Congress in
Geneva, who infonned the U.S. Consulate in Geneva in August. 26 Howard Elting, Jr., the
American Vice Consul in Geneva, sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State in
Washington, repOliing Riegner's infonnation that the Nazis aimed at killing three to four
million Jews in occupied territories. 27 While Elting could not confinn the infonnation, he
stressed to his superiors his impression that Riegner was " ... a serious and balanced
individual and that he would never have come to the Consulate with the above report if
he had not had confidence in his infonnant's reliability and ifhe did not seriously
consider that the report might well contain an element oftruth.,,28 Elting could not prove
Riegner's repOli, but took it seriously enough to encourage his superiors to examine it
closely.
Other State Department officials treated Riegner's claims about the Holocaust
with much more skepticism than did Elting. A separate telegram from Bern emphasized
that the Legation could not verify the accuracy of Riegner' s report and warned, "The
report has eannarks of war rumor inspired by fear and what is cOlmnonly understood to

Wyman, 42.
Ibid., 43.
27 Telegram to the Secretary of State, August 11, 1942. "The American Experience: America and
the Holocaust" http://www.pbs.org/wgbhJamex/holocaust/filmmore/reference/primary/index.html (accessed
February 12,2007).
28 Howard Elting, Memorandum to the Secretary of State, August 10, 1942. "The American
Experience: America and the Holocaust"
http://www.pbs.org/wgbhJamex/holocaust/filmmore/reference/primarylindex.html (accessed February 12,
2007).
25
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be the actually miserable condition of these refugees who face decimation as result [sic]
physical maltreatment persecution and scarcely endurable privations malnutlition and
disease.,,29 Mid-level State Department officials dismissed the reports as intelligence on
the fact that the Gennans used Jews for forced labor, not as a confinnation of genocide.
The Department also attempted to limit news of related events coming from Switzerland
in an inexcusable effort to avoid dealing with the issue. 3D
It is impossible to tell how much longer it would have been before America's

confinnation of the Holocaust became public had it not been for another series of events.
On September 2, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles received information regarding
the Holocaust fi'om British intelligence and passed it along to American Rabbi Stephen
Wise, a prominent Jewish leader involved in both the American Jewish Congress and the
World Jewish Congress. While Wise attempted to infonn the government and provide
some help for the Jews, the next months brought few results. Finally, in late November,
1942, Welles received confinnation of the Riegner repOli from the American Legation in
Switzerland and granted Wise pennission to publicize knowledge of the Final Solution?1
In his autobiography, Wise recorded Welles' words to him, "For reasons you will
understand, I cannot give these to the press, but there is no reason why you should not. It
might even help if you did.,,32 On November 24, 1942 Rabbi Wise held a press
conference to reveal the news ofthe Holocaust to the people ofthe United States.

29

Telegram to the Secretary of State.
Wyman, 43-44.
31 Ibid., 47-49.
32 Stephen Wise, The Challenging Years: The Autobiography of Stephen Wise (G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 1949). "The American Experience: America and the Holocaust"
http://www .pbs. org/wgbhlamex/Holocaust/filmmore/reference/primarylindex.html#bar (accessed February
12,2007).
30
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David Wyman provides an accurate summary of the impact of Rabbi Wise's
announcement when he writes, "From then on, the news of Hitler's plan to amlihilate the
Jews was available to everyone in the democratic world who cared to know. But those
not especially concerned were hardly confronted with the problem, because the news
media gave it little prominence. ,,33 While major newspapers reported the story, only five
of nineteen major papers featured it on the ii-ont page and two did not carry it at all. 34
The Chicago Daily Tribune's November 25, 1942 edition reported Wise's announcement
that 4 million Jews had been killed in the Nazis' "extermination campaign.',35 The
Washington Post's entry consisted of two brief paragraphs and had a skeptical tone. The
headline ran, "2 Million Jews Slain, Rabbi Wise Asserts" and the article emphasized the
news as Dr. Wise's claims, rather than confirmed U.S. intelligence. 36 The New York
Times gave more emphasis and sense of urgency to the news of the Holocaust than the
other two papers. On November 25, 1942, it reported that 250,000 Polish Jews had been
killed in a scheme to eliminate all the Jews and that Dr. Wise had confinned the
infornlation. The article's wording was umnistakable. It used tenns such as
"extennination" and "complete liquidation" in referring to the Nazis' goals for the Jewish
population in Poland.37 All three of these papers failed to put Dr. Wise's announcement
on the front page though. The Chicago Daily Tribune reported it on page 4, The
Washington Post, on page 6, and the New York Times, on page 10. Such limited coverage
was typical of American media during World War II. News of the Holocaust was

Wyman, 6l.
Ibid., 6l.
35 "2 Million Jews Slain by the Nazis, Dr. Wise Avers," Chicago Daily Tribune, November 25,
33

34

1942.
36
37

1942.

"2 Million Jews Slain, Rabbi Wise Asserts," The Washington Post, November 25, 1942.
James MacDonald, "Rimmler Program Kills Polish Jews," New York Times, November 25,
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available, but one had to follow international affairs closely in order to glean the
necessary infonnation. Jewish newspapers and liberal papers featured news of the
Holocaust, but the general public often did not read such periodicals.
Despite meager media coverage, knowledge of the Holocaust slowly trickled into
the American consciousness and found varied responses. Ben Hecht, an AmericanJewish writer, sought to reveal the atrocities committed against the Jews and impress
their fate upon the memories of Americans. His piece published in the February 1943
edition of Readers' Digest recounted the massacre of two million Jews by the Nazis and
called America to "Remember US.,,38 Such articles increased American awareness and
help build the case against America's inaction. Infonnation about the Holocaust did
provoke some response from Americans. In April 1943 the Washington Post reported on
a pageant staged in Constitution Hall to COlmnemorate the murders of the Jews and help
push for increased ilmnigration quotas at the upcoming Bennuda Conference. 39 Some
Americans reacted to news ofthe Holocaust with anger and calls for action. For
example, Freda Kirchwey, editor of Nation, made special pleas for attention to the
Holocaust using vigorous and impassioned language. She argued that the lack of U.S.
action constituted complicity with Gennany's brutality. Amelica was as guilty as Hitler.
She wrote, "In this country, you and I and the President and the Congress and the State
Department are accessories to the Clime and share Hitler's guilt.,,40 Kirchwey demanded
increased immigration quotas. The above authors illustrate that some Americans cared

38

Ben Hecht, "Remember Us," Readers' Digest, FeblUary 1943 in America Views the Holocaust,

146-149.
"We Will Never Die," The Washington Post, April 14, 1943.
Freda Kirchwey, "While the Jews Die," Nation, March 13, 1943 inAmerica Views the
Holocaust, 153.
39

40
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deeply about what the Nazis were doing to the Jews in Europe and advocated action
against it. Unfortunately, their pleas produced few results.
Modem readers who benefit from hindsight may be tempted to hastily condemn
Americans for their apathy when they had infonnation available concerning the
Holocaust. In order to understand the media's limited coverage and the public's
insufficient interest, one must examine the historical context. When newspapers first
reported limited news ofthe Final Solution, America was engaged in a total war with the
Axis countries that dominated policymakers' thinking and the public's attention. 41 Rabbi
Stephen Wise noted to a colleague shortly after a rally in September 1942, " ... in time of
war it is very difficult to get people excited, generally speaking, about atrocities. All of
war is basically such an atrocity that it is difficult to move people with respect to special
atrocities ... ,,42 Americans viewed Gennan behavior holistically and recognized that the
Gennan government treated all of its citizens harshly, not just the Jews.43 Thus, news of
Nazi cruelty did not surprise them. The news encountered initial skepticism as well
because during World War I rumors of Gennan barbarities had been widely circulated
only to be discredited later. 44 People were cautious about jumping to conclusions a
second time. Further, during World War II, the tenn 'genocide' did not even exist in the
English language. Most people had difficulty understanding that the German govermnent
planned to destroy an entire population simply because of their race. Most people

41 Henry L. Feingold, The Politics ofRescue The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust,
1938-1945 (New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 1970), xi-xii.
42 Richard Breitman and Alan Kraut, American Refugee Policy and European Jew})!, 1933-1945
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 153.
43 Peter Novick, The Holocaust and American Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999),
26.
44 Varian Fry, "The Massacre of the Jews," New Republic December 21,1942 in America Views
the Holocaust, 127. See also, Richard Breitman, Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned and What the
British and Americans Knew (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998),8.
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recognized that persecution ofthe Jews occurred, but could not grasp its scale or intent. 45
While the Holocaust was a unique event, the American public and policymakers failed to
distinguish it from the other atrocities of war and thus did not give it the attention it
warranted.
Another reason for the limited response to the news of the Holocaust was antiSemitism in the United States at the time, both among the public and govermnent leaders.
During the Great Depression, the U.S. govermnent severely limited immigration so as to
ensure that the limited number of available jobs went to American citizens, not
foreigners. President Herbert Hoover further ordered the administration to be careful not
to admit those who might become a 'public charge. ,46 This standard proved instmmental
in preventing Jews fi'om entering the United States during World War II. The quota
system favored Nordic or Aryan peoples over Jews. 47 Many Americans blamed the Jews
for the Depression as well, contributing to stereotypes of Jews as linked with
communism, Bolshevism or economic problems.48 Statistics demonstrate that during
World War II, many Americans still maintained negative feelings toward Jews. Leonard
Dinnerstein notes that at this time more than 40% of the American public would support
or sympathize with a campaign against the Jews, over half would not be opposed to an
anti-Semitic Congressional candidate, and almost 25% would be more inclined to support
such a candidate. 49 Anti-Semitic organizations existed in the United States, including one
led by Catholic priest, Charles E. Coughlin, whose popular weekly radio show strongly

Rubenstein, 169.
Henry Feingold, Bearing Witnes: How America and Its Jews Responded to the Holocaust.
(Syracuse, N.y':Syracuse University Press, 1995), 6l.
47 Ibid., 6l.
48 Leonard Dilmerstein, America and the Survivors of the Holocaust (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1982),2.
49 Ibid., 6.
45
46
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criticized Jews. Anti-semitic groups often distributed propaganda against the Jews,
desecrated Jewish synagogues and cemeteries, and incited fights with Jewish youth in
cities such as New York and Boston. 5o Such hostile feelings made immigration to the
United States difficult for those fleeing the Third Reich.
Anti-Semitism is significant to historians examining the U.S. response to the
Holocaust for two main reasons. First, it helps to explain why Americans reacted to the
news ofthe Holocaust the way they did. While anti-Semitism is taboo in today's society,
the fact that people tolerated and even accepted it before and during World War II meant
that many Americans felt little sympathy for or obligation to help the Jews. Thus, even if
American media had been more attentive to the Holocaust, anti-Semitism meant that
knowledge would not necessarily have created action. 51 Second, anti-Semitism made
rescue and relief efforts on behalf of Holocaust victims politically difficult if not
impossible. While most people dislike the idea that government officials put political
considerations over saving lives, historians must recognize the decision-making process
of actors at this time. Some government officials refused to take action because of their
prejudice toward the Jews. Other officials who were willing to help had to be careful not
to give the appearance of special treatment for the Jews for fear of a public backlash that
would pressure Congress to ban immigration entirely or a ban all assistance for the Jews.
Thus some leaders concluded that a small tlickle of help for the Jews was the best they
could do and better than no aid at all. 52 A balanced analysis of America's knowledge and
response toward the Holocaust must consider political constraints on government action.

Wyman, 9-1l.
Breitman and Kraut, 4-5.
52 Ibid., 63.
50
51
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In addition to evaluating the inf0l111ation Americans had regarding the Holocaust,
the historians must then examine what actions the American government and people took
on behalf of the Jews compared to what was possible. HistOlians often point to three
areas where different U. S. policies could have saved lives during the Holocaust:
liberalizing immigration policies, initiating rescue and relief efforts, and bombing the
death camps or rail lines leading to them. In evaluating each area, one must keep in mind
important historical principles, especially considering the emotional and honific nature of
the Holocaust. Today, the Holocaust looms as the epitome of human cmelty and evil;
thus, modern histOlians often conclude that the Allies should have taken any action
possible to stop the deadly work ofthe extennination chambers. While that may be tme,
modern histOlians must be careful not to judge the actions of the past by cun-ent
knowledge and values. An objective analysis must consider the political environment at
the time, the focus on the war effort, and the unprecedented nature of the Holocaust.
Also, before criticizing the United States for failure to take a specific action that could
have helped victims ofthe Holocaust, historians must prove someone proposed such an
action at the time and that it had a chance of success. 53 Objective consideration of which
policies were possible and potentially successful is necessary in order to detennine
whether the United States was a passive accomplice to the Final Solution, a guiltless
bystander, or stood somewhere in between.
Henry Feingold echoes the sentiments of many historians when he claims, "The
visa system [of the United States] became literally an adjunct to Berlin's murderous plan
for the Jews.,,54 So wide is the consensus that the U.S. immigration policy unjustly

53
54

Breitman and Kraut, 2.
Feingold, The Politics ofRescue, 296.
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prevented Jews from fleeing Nazi Gennany that William Rubenstein compares
challenging this idea to challenging that the earth revolves around the sun. 55 While U.S.
immigration policy erected huge bureaucratic barriers to entry, such as waiting periods,
cumbersome visa applications, background checks, and requirements that immigrants
have sponsorship by an American citizen, it is far from certain that changes in
immigration policy would have saved large numbers of Jews or changed the course of the
Final Solution. Still, officials should have relaxed immigration policies to save as many
lives as possible, especially in the late 1930s when Jews could have still left Gennany.
Before and during World War II, the United States had restrictive immigration laws, and
the State Department interpreted the laws as nalTowly as possible. A change in these
policies would have saved some lives, but would not have altered the result of the Final
Solution significantly.
Even before the Great Depression the United States severely restricted
immigration through a quota system and obstmctive policies. From the time Hitler first
came to power, the U.S. government experienced internal stmggles regarding what its
immigration policy should be. In 1933, as Hitler's persecution of the Jews increased,
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt expressed willingness to admit prominent Jews into
the United States as a 'moral gesture.' 56 He charged Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins
with alTanging for such events. Perkins was sympathetic toward immigrants and worked
to fill the immigration quotas and admit more people to the United States, but she
encountered resistance from other departments and officials. Commissioner of
IImnigration Colonel Daniel MacConnack resisted Perkins' efforts because he did not see

55
56

Rubenstein, 16.
Breitman and Kraut, 12.
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a physical threat to the Jews at the time and worried about employment rates in the
United States. The State Department also wanted to limit immigration, using such rules
as the 'public liability' charge and the requirement that immigrants have close relatives in
the United States who could support them. 57 MacCormack also shared a fear that was
cOlllillon among the bureaucracy that if they filled immigration quotas with Jews,
Congress would respond negatively and limit immigration even further. 58 Thus, many in
the bureaucracy sought to prevent their policies from attracting attention in order to keep
Congress and the public from becoming involved.
In the years illlinediately preceding World War II, President Roosevelt and the
State Department relaxed immigration quotas. In the wake of Kristallnacht in 1938,
President Roosevelt allowed nearly 15,000 people from Gennany and Austria who were
in the United States on visitor's pennits to remain even if their pennits had expired. In a
press conference on November 18, 1938 he told reporters, " ... I cannot, in any decent
humanity, throw them out.,,59 The administration also increased the quotas to 40,000
people per year from Gennany.60 While the change in policy was an improvement, the
quota was still extremely small considering the number of Jews living in Gennany.
Complex visa procedures also meant that the quotas remained unfilled. Public opinion
once again limited U.S. policies. A Gallup poll conducted shortly after Kristallnacht
showed that most Americans opposed what the Gennans did to the Jews, but 77% still
opposed admitting more Jewish exiles. 61 Still, March 1938-September 1939 was the

Ibid., 12, 16-19.
Ibid., 27.
59 Jolm Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project [online]. Santa Barbara,
CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database).
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws!?pid=15574 (accessed March 6, 2007).
60 Wyman, 124.
61 Breitman and Kraut, 64.
57
58
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most liberal phase of US. immigration as 20,000 people fi'om Gennany came to
America. 62
While outbreak of World War II brought many more refugees to the United
States, it also increased the State Department's caution concerning who should be
admitted. Some of the restrictive practices included the 'relatives mle' which held that
anyone with relatives in enemy territory had to undergo a special screening process that
could take up to 9 months. 63 The visa application fonn from July 1943 was four feet in
length, front and back, and required each applicant to have two American sponsors. 64
Additionally, the State Department required proof that the applicant was in 'acute danger'
before he or she could enter the countly. The danger requirement excluded those trying
to enter from or through Spain, Portugal and N011h Africa. 65 Otto Frank, father of Anne
Frank whose diary is now famous, faced the frustrations of American visa policies. In
1941 he attempted to get himself and his family out of the Nazi-occupied Netherlands,
but failed despite his connections in America. The fact that the Franks had relatives
living in Nazi Gennany made it nearly impossible to obtain visas because of strict
American laws. The Franks were only some of the 300,000 people on the waiting list to
immigrate to the United States.66 The tragic fate of the young girl, Anne Frank, and her
family demonstrates the potentially dire consequences of America's tight immigration
policies.
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Additionally, Americans limited immigration out of fear that a 'fifth column'
would enter the United States. Originally used during the Spanish Civil War, the 'fifth
column' refelTed to people in Madrid who supported Francisco Franco against the
Spanish Republic. 67 U.S. officials feared that the Nazis might send spies to the United
States as ilmnigrants. Both State Department officials and the President expressed fears
that spies might enter the nation as refugees. 68 A 1940 Roper poll in Fortune magazine
showed that 71 % of the American people thought that Gennany had started organizing a
fifth column in the United States. Media and sensational books fanned public fears and
contributed to even more restrictionist sentiment. 69 Consequently, the administration
adopted harsher policies to counter the threat such as fingerprinting for all refugees and
wiretapping phones of those the Attorney General considered suspicious. 7o While the
government overstated the threat of a fifth column and law enforcement officials charged
few refugees for spying,71 the fear such an idea created fuliher intensified the already
restrictionist atmosphere in Washington.
If American immigration laws were not already tight enough, enforcement of
those laws by State Department and other officials kept even more people out of the
United States and ensured that the government did not fill the small quotas. In particular,
histOlians have sharply criticized Breckenridge Long, head ofthe Special War Problems
Division of the State Department and assistant Secretary of State, who had jurisdiction
over refugee matters. While histOlians continue to debate whether or not Long was antiSemitic, he favored enforcing immigration restlictions as nalTowly as possible out of
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fears of a fifth column or Congressional backlash to more liberal policies. 72 Long's
efforts blocked 75% of immigration during the time he controlled policies and also
prevented funding for organizations such as the Intergovenm1ental Committee of
Refugees. 73 Long's own words demonstrate his and many other officials' attitude toward
immigration:
We can delay and effectively stop for a temporary period of indefinite length the
number ofilmnigrants into the United States. We could do this by simply
advising our consuls, to put every obstacle in the way and to require additional
evidence and to resort to various administrative devices which would postpone
and postpone and postpone the granting ofthe visas. 74
Based on conversations he had with President Roosevelt, Long believed that the
President supported his effOlis to postpone the granting of visas for as long as possible. 75
Long viewed himself as fulfilling a vital role in protecting the nation from spies and
sought to apply the visa laws unifonnly, if narrowly. Still, his personal biases against the
Jews may have been a factor as he linked communism with Judaism and at one point
praised Mein KampJfor its opposition to the Jews?6 The practices of bureaucrats such as
Long often detennined govemment policies as a whole. Even if Roosevelt wanted a
more liberal policy, his preoccupation with the war and hands-off approach as president
prevented direct intervention into such affairs. 77 Thus, Long and other State Depmiment
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officials could allow prejudice and fear to influence their application of visa policies and
prevent immigration into the United States.
One of the most dramatic examples ofthe deadly effects of America's restrictive
immigration quotas was the fate ofthe passenger ship the St. Louis. In June 1939 the St.

Louis sailed from Gennany to Havana, carrying refugees that all had landing pennits for
which they had paid. The Cubans declared the pennits invalid on May 5 and did not
allow the passengers to disembark in Havana. The passengers met the same response in
Miami. After days of waiting and rejection from stubbom immigration officers, the St.

Louis retumed to Europe. 78 The captain found refuge for the passengers in France and
other European countries. His success proved short-lived though because within a few
years the Nazis overran these countries and depOlied many of the passengers to
Auschwitz and other concentration camps.79 For the 937 passengers on the St. Louis,
nearly all of whom were fleeing the Third Reich, U.S. and Cuban immigration policy
proved fatal.
While the St. Louis provides a dramatic illustration of the lives lost as a result of
restrictive iImnigration policies, changes in U.S. policies would not have saved massive
numbers of people or altered the course of the Final Solution. In the early years of
Hitler's regime when Jews could have fled, few were willing to go. Many of them
resisted leaving their homes and country to live in nations that they considered their
enemies less then twenty years ago. so Gennan Jews had experienced persecution before
and thought that Hitler's policies were only temporary and their lives would soon retum
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to nonna1. 81 Even when the Nazis put them in ghettos, many Jews did not believe they
would die, but thought that working with their captors would best ensure their surviva1. 82
Also, more liberal immigration policies would not have saved Jews living outside of
Gelmany in areas the Nazis would eventually conquer. These Jews had no way of
knowing the danger they were in and would not have left their homes. 83 Also, the
Holocaust did not begin until at least 1939, so there was no way the United States could
have predicted the dire need for more immigration in the 1930s. Once the Holocaust
began, liberalization would have helped few if any Jews because Hitler would not have
released them. Hitler viewed himself and his nation as fighting a race war where only
one side could emerge viCtOlious. Once Gennany had officially adopted the Final
Solution, nothing would convince Hitler to release his captives to the United States or
any other neutral nation. 84 As Lucy Dawidowitz commented, "So long as he cOlmnanded
the European continent from the Atlantic wall to the gates to Moscow and Leningrad, the
fate of the Jews in his gIip depended on his, Hitler's, Will.',s5 A key flaw with much
analysis on immigI'ation and rescue effOlis is the failure to consider Hitler's reaction to
Allied policies. Ultimately, the United States did not control the fate of the Jews; Hitler
did. Thus, while U.S. immigration policies were overly restrictive and changing them
could have saved some lives, it is impossible to know for sure how many Jews could
have been saved or whether different U.S. policies would have altered or prevented the
Holocaust. The number would have been limited.
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A second general area in which historians claim the United States could have
helped the Jews is rescue or relief efforts. Historians argue that the United States should
have attempted to get Jews out of Axis territory or provide relief for those under Nazi
control. The most prominent proposals include the Transnistria rescue plan, an increased
role for the War Refugee Board, and sending supplies to the concentration camps. Most
rescue plans failed to account for the war effort and Hitler's resistance to any interference
with the Final Solution.
In the fall of 1942, the Allies encountered one oftheir first and biggest
opportunities to rescue European Jews. "Transnistria" was an area in southeastern
Ukraine where the Gennans deported more than 150,000 Jews and placed them in
concentration camps. The conditions were telTible as the prisoners had little food or
shelter and suffered from disease, unsanitary conditions, and violence fl.·om the Romanian
soldiers who guarded them. 86 An opportunity arose to aid the suffering Jews when
Jewish leaders in Romania received an offer to help move 70,000 refugees to neutral
areas if the Allies provided the funding (approximately $130 perperson).87 Henry
Feingold argues that Hitler would have allowed the scheme as he was anxious to placate
the Romanians after the loss of a large part of their anny in Russia. 88 While the
Transnistria plan seemed like a golden 0ppOliunity, there were several problems that
would have made it unworkable. For one, the Romanians never made a clear offer. The
negotiations that did take place were not between U.S. officials and Romanians leaders,
but between the underground Jewish leadership in Romania and several men who
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claimed to own the Romanian branch of a Gennan shipping company and wanted to help
the Jews. There were several different proposed ilIDlligration schemes and Jewish leaders
could never fully verify their genuineness. 89 The negotiations may have been pmt of a
Nazi scheme to extort money from Jewish organizations or create struggles within these
groupS.90 Such an operation would also have hampered the war efforts on two levels.
First, the Romanians had been fighting with Hitler's annies at StalingI°ad so making an
agreement with them would have potentially angered America's ally, the Soviet Union. 91
Also the price for releasing the refugees would have been large and logistics difficult
while there was no guarantee that the Romanians were sincere and the money would not
have gone to them or the Axis. The biggest hurdle would have been getting Hitler's
approval for such an operation. 92 By 1942 the Final Solution was in full operation and
Hitler was committed to destroying the Jews entirelyo Considering Hitler's obsession
with the Holocaust, Feingold's optimism that Hitler would agI°ee is unwananted.
The Transnistria rescue plan shared problems common to all proposals for rescue
during the Holocaust. Most Allied leaders and Jewish Americans believed that winning
the war was the fastest and best way to end the Nazi extennination program. Eleanor
Roosevelt was known for her humanitarian efforts, and she expressed concern for the
plight of the Jews, but even she agreed that winning the war provided the best help for
victims ofthe Nazis. In an overseas broadcast for the Office of War Information she
stated, "We hope that ways may be found to save as many people as possible, but the best
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way to do that is to win the war as rapidly as possible ... ,,93 The nations had mobilized
completely for total war against the Gemlans and a major effort to rescue the Jews could
have compromised the war effort, especially since the Allies felt they were in a race
against time to prevent the Gennan development of a superweapon. 94 Moreover, the
Allies had nowhere to move large numbers of Jewish refugees as few nations were
willing to accept them. 95 Shipping was tight as well, and until mid-1943 Allied
commanders considered shipping to be the largest restraint on military actions;96 thus,
diverting ships to rescue efforts could have been problematic. As previously mentioned,
any rescue attempts to save the victims ofthe Final Solution ultimately relied on Hitler's
pennission, which he would not give. Finally, even ifthe United States had been
completely cOlmnitted to rescue effOlis, she would have failed without the help of other
Allies, neutral countries, governments-in-exiles and people in occupied countries. U.S.
leadership in rescue efforts would not necessarily have forced others to follow. 97 Factors
beyond the control of the United States severely limited the prospects for successful
rescue effOlis.
EffOlis at rescue became part of official government policy with the creation of
the War Refugee Board in 1944. After several years of inaction on behalf of European
Jews, pressure from Congress and the public finally built to the point where Roosevelt
had to take some action. The result was that on January 22, 1944 Executive Order 9417
created the War Refugee Board to help aid and rescue victims of the Holocaust. Its
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efforts centered on evacuating Jews from Axis telTitories, using psychological threats to
convince neutrals or Axis allies to stop cooperating with Hitler, and providing relief
supplies to the concentration camps.98 While the War Refugee Board did its best, it
lacked sufficient funds to make a difference and often received little cooperation from
other departments with the exception of the Treasury Department. 99 U.S. delegations
abroad worked with the Board as much as possible, with the exception of Spain. 100 No
doubt the War Refugee Board did some good and saved some lives, but it had little
power, funding, or time. Historians such as David Wyman argue that had Roosevelt
created the War Refugee Board earlier, more lives would have been saved. While that
may be true, such a move would have been politically impossible as improved Allied
prospects in the war effort partially account for the creation of the War Refugee Board. IOI
The War Refugee Board made what changes it could to American policies, but an earlier
or increased role for it was not politically or militmily possible.
Another possible way in which the Allies could have aided the Jews was through
providing supplies to the prisoners in the concentration camps. Since rescue policies
failed or were infeasible, the Allies might have been able to buy time for the victims of
the Nazis by providing them with enough food and supplies to last until the Allied annies
could liberate them. Beginning in 1943, the International Red Cross sent aid to the
concentration camps, and after the creation of the War Refugee Board; the United States
expanded effOlis to help prisoners, especially Jews.
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have been a worthy humanitarian goal, but its effects were limited. For one thing, the
Nazis alone detennined how much food the Allies could send and who would receive it.
When the Red Cross first sent in supplies, it could only address specific imnates by name.
Also, the camps prevented the Red Cross from helping those most in need--Jews and
'unassimilated' plisoners. 103 Also, the Allies wonied that food aid would help the Axis
militarily. The Gennans could have used the aid to provide for their own populations and
annies, thus directly helping their war effort or they may have been relieved of the
burden of providing for the Jews, thereby freeing resources for military use. The United
States and other organizations did attempt to send reliefto the camps, but their efforts
were limited by logistics and the Nazi policies.
The final area in which historians generally agree the United States showed
complicity with the Holocaust is the failure to bomb the death camps or the rail lines
leading to them. The first request to bomb the camps came in mid-1944 from Orthodox
Rabbi, Dov Weissmandel and reached the War Refugee Board on June 18. 104 Subsequent
requests came from Jacob Rosenheim of the Agudas Israel World Organization, who
claimed that bombing would slow depOliations to Auschwitz and save lives by enabling
the plisoners to hold out until the Allies could fi-ee them. IOS The War Refugee Board also
requested bombings, saying that though the operation might not be entirely successful, it
would signal Allied anger over the camps and possibly save some lives in the future. 106
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The War Department consistently rejected such requests on the basis that they could not
spare air power fi'om the war effort and that the fastest way to stop the death camps was
through defeating Hitler. 107 Since then, historians have condemned the United States by
using many of the original arguments for bombing: the bombing would have sent a signal
that the Allies disapproved of Gennany' s actions, saved some lives, and perhaps
discouraged Axis countries from cooperating with the N azis. 108 The Allies made the
cOlTect decision in declining to bomb the camps because such an operation faced military,
logistical, and moral balTiers while offering dubious chance of success at best.
From a military standpoint, bombing would have diverted key resources from the
war effort, while risking valuable aircraft and personnel. In the total war struggle with
Gennany, the Allies had to muster every resource possible to defeat the Axis. Air power
was vital to this strategy.109 While bombing was proposed in mid-1944, the Allies did
not control the skies of Europe until August 1944, II 0 so bombing could have diverted
resources fi'om critical battles. Wyman suggests that using Mosquito fighter-bombers
would have provided the ideal weapons for bombing, but the Mosquitos were not
stationed anywhere close to Auschwitz at the time, and their crews were highly trained
and few in number. III The military could not risk such precious human and military
assets.
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From a technical and logistical standpoint, bombing Auschwitz would have been
impossible. The Allies lacked sufficient intelligence to plan a bombing raid such as the
location and dimension ofthe targets, their construction, and potential low-flying
hazards. II2 Planning such an operation would have taken a considerable amount of time
that the Allies did not have. I13 The location of Auschwitz also presented difficulties as it
was nearly beyond the range of the closest Allied bases and would require flying through
the unpredictably dangerous weather of the Alps. 114 Gennan air defenses in the area
could have effectively repulsed a low-level attack and destroyed the Allied planes. II5
Properly targeting the camps would have required perfect visibility and weather which
was unlikely.II6 In their insistence that the Allies take action against the Holocaust, some
historians often ignore the military factors involved in planning a bombing operation
against the camps.
In addition to the military and logistical problems with bombing Auschwitz, the
Allied cOlmnanders faced a moral dilemma as well. Even under ideal conditions, there
was a strong probability that the bombs would fall outside the target area and destroy
imllate housing or other locations and thus kill the people they were supposedly saving. II7
Previous bombing raids supported the fear of civilian casualties. An attack on the
Amiens jail in February 1944 killed or maimed over 200 prisoners, while guards quickly
recaptured those who escaped.118 In an attack on Gestapo headquarters in Cogenhagen
on March 21, 1945, the Allies lost four out of eighteen Mosquito bombers, two out of
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twenty-eight Mustang fighters, and ten ainnen. One bomber crashed into a school,
killing eighty-three children, ten nuns, and six resistance prisoners in the Gestapo
building. Advocates of bombing often point out that the inmates were going to die
anyway, but that was far from certain as many survived the Holocaust. Even if the
prisoners were going to die, that is hardly a justification for Allied action that would have
directly caused their deaths. Even the most extreme circumstances do not justify
intentional killing of civilians and non-combatants to send a signal to the enemy.
The final consideration regarding the bombing of Auschwitz is the potential
effectiveness of such a plan. Logistically, Allied bombing would have had little impact
on the operation of the death camps. Had the Allies bombed rail lines to Auschwitz, the
Gennans could have used other lines to deport prisoners. Attempts to bomb the railroad
lines leading to Rome proved that the Gennans had 'redundant capacity' and could use
altemate routes and quickly rebuild. I 19 Even if the Allies succeeded in destroying the gas
chambers at one death camp, the Gennans could have sent plisoners to another.
Bombing the death camps would also have failed to deter the killings.
Accusations that the United States had killed imnates at the camp as a result of a bombing
raid would have conupted any signal or moral high ground bombing may have created.
Bombing also would not have helped the imllates significantly. There was a good chance
that some ofthem might die directly from the bombing and the experience at the Amiens
prison proved that the Gennans could quickly recapture the weak and exhausted
prisoners. l2O Given Hitler's fanatical commitment to destroying the Jews, it is unlikely
that one campaign would have detened him from continuing the Holocaust. The United

119
120

Foregger, 412.
Dawidowitz, 175.

Accessory to Genocide? 33
States had already put diplomatic pressure on Hitler by passing a resolution condemning
Nazi war crimes and threatening U. S. retribution. Death of Gennan civilians or soldiers
made little difference to Hitler. The British had bombed Gennan cities in retaliation, but
Hitler still launched V-2 rockets at London in 1944. 121 Hitler had already demonstrated
his irrational and calloused behavior. Bombing the gas chambers probably would not
have changed his attitude or approach toward the Jews. Considering the slim chance of
success and the likelihood of causing more deaths, the Allied refusal to bomb Auschwitz
should not be considered a failure, but a wise decision.
The Holocaust has generated significant academic study and debate. Because the
Holocaust was so honible and beyond anything previously experienced by western
civilization, scholars react strongly to it and have difficulty maintaining their objectivity,
thus producing polarizing opinions. Assigning responsibility for the Holocaust plays an
impOliant role in attempts to fully deal with it. With regard to the United States, the
American government and public knew the Nazis were brutally killing the Jews, though
Amelican media failed to give it sufficient attention. The war consumed most of the
public focus, and widespread anti-Semitism dampened concern for the Jews of Europe.
The American public's mindset patiially detennined which policies were politically
viable in seeking to help the Jews. American immigration policy proved unnecessarily
restrictive, and liberalization certainly would have saved lives as the St. Louis example
demonstrates. Still, modification of one aspect of American policy could not alter the
course of the Final Solution. The United States made some attempts at rescue and relief
of the death camps, especially late in the war with the creation of the War Refugee Board,
but the success of her efforts was detennined more by Nati policies than American
121
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effOlis. Finally, bombing the death camps would have proven infeasible, ineffective, and
potentially hamlful to the imnates without significantly hampering the deadly work of the
camps. Only by over-simplifying the facts can one clearly assign blame for the
Holocaust,122 but careful analysis concludes that while the United States should have
modified her immigration policies, there was little else she could do to halt the killing.
Thus responsibility for the Holocaust lies primarily with its Nazi perpetrators.
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